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1 INAUGURAL LECTURER’S RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP TRAJECTORY 
 
For at least three and a half decades, my thought life has been pre-occupied with the legal 
and policy-related instruments/options available to a society genuinely committed to 
transforming itself into a haven of justice, dignity and material well-being for all, especially 
for the poor and vulnerable. This probably has to do with the humility of my background. 
Accordingly, unlike most law graduates who have a strong bias towards commercial law, 
my passion and special interest lie in those areas of law that are capable of directly assisting 
a nation to quicken the pace of holistic transformation through, inter alia, the prevention of 
abuse of power/position and development of service-driven government, the creation of 
liability and accountability rules to prevent abuse of power/position, and the protection of 
vulnerable interests through legal instruments. Against this background, I usually describe 
my areas of research interest as: (a) corporate law (which includes corporate governance); (b) 
international trade law (which includes questions of equitable distribution of trade gains 
between the developed and developing worlds; (c) law in aid of development or law in aid 
of good governance (which includes public authority liability); and (d) human rights in the 
market place.  
 
So, how do my scholarship outputs and ongoing research work support the above claims? 
At this stage, I am probably best known for my published writings on the regulation of 
insider trading. Consisting of five papers, these writings deal with the (illegal) practice of 
trading on financial markets while in possession of confidential/non-public information – 
which practice falls within the subject of corporate governance (although it also implicates 
serious questions of financial markets regulation). These papers published between 1997 and 
2004 in South Africa and the United Kingdom are largely based on research and insights 
drawn from my doctoral thesis submitted at the University of Toronto, Canada, in 1994. I am 
especially proud of my last paper on the South African regulatory regime published in 2000 
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in the Journal of African Law and entitled: “The New South African Insider Trading Act of 
1998: Sound Law Reform or Regulatory Overkill”. This paper is cited in most legal writings 
produced after 2000 on the subject of insider trading regulation in South Africa. 
 
The book I co-authored with Professor Chuks Okpaluba is a source of much personal 
satisfaction and pride. Entitled: “Government Liability – South Africa and the 
Commonwealth”, this treatise is the first of its kind in Africa and the Commonwealth. Since 
appearing in 2010, it has been the subject of no less than three exceptionally positive (book) 
reviews published in accredited South African law journals. According to those reviews, the 
book presents an excellently written and authoritative analysis of the constitutional and 
doctrinal foundations of public authority liability. 
 
In my four published papers on the subject of international trade law, I have been especially 
drawn to those aspects that are most likely to adversely impact the development trajectory 
of developing countries. Hence, those writings dealt with issues such as: (a) the treatment of 
state interests in international investment/commercial arbitrations; (b) the practice of 
dumping and the regulation of state responses to the practice; and (c) the origins of the 
Southern African Development Community. 
 
My other writings that can be collated into a series are: 
 My two published essays on black economic empowerment (BEE) which were 
among the very first detailed legal academic discussion of this thorny subject; and 
 My four papers on (a) the legality of unilateral bank variation of the interest rate 
provisions of home loan agreements, (b) HIV-related workplace discrimination, (c) 
hospital liability for negligence in Canada, and (d) employer liability for sexual 
harassment in South Africa.1 
 
2 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SCHOLARSHIP IN AFRICA – PAST AND PRESENT 
In terms of scholarship, public procurement is a subject that is much neglected by Africa-
based legal scholars. A number of factors might be responsible for that state of affairs. First 
is the fact that the subject is one that sits on what can be accurately described as the 
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public/private law divide – in that the issues and concerns it raises fall into areas of public 
law (notably constitutional and administrative law) and private law (notably law of contract 
and delict).2 The result is that most legal scholars who specialise in only one of these fields 
lack the required levels of comfort and interest in researching the said issues. Second, prior 
to the public procurement law reform developments dating back to the last 10 years, this 
area of law was highly underdeveloped in most African countries. It is a well-known fact 
that these developments are largely the result of pressure externally imposed on African 
countries (with the exception of South Africa).3 Thirdly, the subject of public procurement 
was in most parts of Africa shrouded in secrecy coupled with governance failures at the 
highest levels of public administration. This factor militated against litigation or protest 
action by disappointed bidders/suppliers which, in turn, resulted in a stunted 
jurisprudence. Against that background, active and credible legal scholarship on public 
procurement in Africa was, until recently, largely impossible. 
 
3 INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE INAUGURAL LECTURE 
Public procurement involves a series of actions and processes intended to obtain goods and 
services required by the state and state-related entities for the purposes of delivering on 
their public mandates.4 Accordingly, they constitute a special genre of commercial 
transactions partly because they give birth to contracts intended for the exclusive benefit of 
citizens and society and partly because they involve the expenditure of public funds (the 
people’s common wealth).5 However, these two unique features of public procurement also 
make it especially vulnerable to illegal and unethical conduct on the part of both the private 
players (suppliers of goods and services) and those charged with the responsibility of 
superintending the process and protecting the public interests therein.6 Herein lies the 
critical importance of ensuring effective regulation and good governance of public 
                                                          
2  See generally Quinot Regulation of State Commercial Activity (2009) especially chapters 5 and 6. 
3 Quinot and Arrowsmith “Introduction” in Quinot and Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement 
Regulation in Africa (2013) at 1-2 (hereafter, Quinot and Arrowsmith 2013) 
4 Arrowsmith “National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: 
Harmony or Conflict” in Arrowsmith and Davies (eds) Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998) at 
3 (hereafter, Arrowsmith and Davies 1998); and Quinot and Arrowsmith “Introduction” in Quinot 
and Arrowsmith 2013 at 1-2. 
5  Ibid at 7-8. 
6 Ibid. Such conduct can take a variety of forms. See Linarelli “Corruption in Developing Countries 
and in Countries in Transition: Legal and Economic Perspectives” in Arrowsmith and Davies 1998 
125 at 126-130; Gray and Kaufmann “Corruption and Development” (1998) March Finance & 
Development 7; Aidt “Corruption, institutions, and economic development” (2009) 25 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 271; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Bribery in Public 
Procurement: Methods, Actors and Counter-Measures (2007) 17-26. 
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procurement processes.7 The principles pertaining to judicial review of procurement-related 
actions and decisions as well as the jurisdiction of the courts to intervene at any stage in 
those processes constitute the most important pillar of the said regulatory framework.8  
 
In exercising their jurisdiction, South African courts have spawned a jurisprudence of which 
this country can be immensely proud. In my view, this is perhaps the most ‘exportable’ part 
of this country’s public procurement law. Drawing on my ongoing work on the subject, this 
lecture explores the jurisprudential, norm-setting impact of recent decisions handed down 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and the Constitutional Court (CC) in tender-related 
disputes. In particular, the lecture attempts to identify the ‘novel’ principles flowing out of 
those decisions and to assess their rationality. 
 
4 THE RULES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF TENDER-RELATED DECISIONS 
 
A credible discussion of the legal framework of public procurement in South Africa has to 
begin from s 217 of the Constitution which sets out what can be described as the qualitative 
principles and values9 with which the relevant actions/decisions must comply. The first sub-
section stipulates that: 
“When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or 
any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, 
it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective.”10 
                                                          
7  Quinot State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 3-5. 
8 In particular, the availability of judicial interventions in the public procurement process at the behest 
of disappointed bidders significantly contributes to the transparency and accountability profile of a 
country’s procurement system. See Gordon “Constructing a bid protest process: The choices that 
every procurement challenge system must make” (2006) 35 Public Contract LJ 427, 428 and 431. 
9  It must be hastily pointed out that additional effect has been given to the public procurement-
related principles and values through the enactment of a series of prominent legislation, notably: the 
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) which regulates financial management at all three 
levels of government; the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) and the Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000 (as amended by Act 44 of 2003) which regulate related matters or processes at 
the local government level; and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
(POCA). See Bolton “The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics” (2008) 37 
Public Contract LJ 781 at 783 (hereafter, Bolton 2008). 
10  S 217(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. My emphasis. According to Professor 
Phoebe Bolton, one of the leading commentators on public procurement in South Africa, s 217 accords 
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It is readily apparent that, in terms of coverage, the section applies to two categories of 
public institutions. The first consists of all the entities qualifying as ‘organs of state’. Section 
239 of the Constitution defines the term ‘organ of state’ to include (a) all departments 
forming part of the three spheres of government – national, provincial and municipal;11 and 
(b)  functionaries or institutions exercising powers or performing functions in terms of either 
the national or provincial constitution or in terms of any legislation.12 The second category to 
which s 217 applies are public institutions and functionaries specifically identified in 
national legislation as entities subject to the section. This category of institutions and 
functionaries includes entities such as the Financial Services Board, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, universities, and parastatals.13  
 
Interestingly, s 217 does not make the open tender method mandatory for all public 
procurement in South Africa.14 However, irrespective of the methodology utilised, the 
constitutional provision requires that every procurement process must: 
 Be consistent with procedural fairness;15  
 Provide equal and reasonable opportunity to all interested parties in respect of 
document submissions and/or making of representations; 
 Be free from conflict of interest, actual bias or a reasonable suspicion of bias by any of 
the decision-makers;16 and 
 As far as the circumstances permit, secure the best possible value for money.17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
constitutional importance “to the objectives of value for money, integrity in public spending practices, 
accountability to the public, and efficiency in the procedure for procurement”. See Bolton “The 
regulatory framework for public procurement in South Africa” in Quinot and Arrowsmith 2013 178 at 
179 (hereafter, Bolton 2013). 
11  This definition is broad enough to include the Department of Defence. See Penfold and Reyburn, 
“Public Procurement” in Woolman and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2013) at 25-4 
(Hereafter, Penfold and Reyburn 2013); and Bolton 2013 at 192. 
12  However, s 239 expressly excludes the courts or judicial officers from its ambit. 
13  See Penfold and Reyburn 2013; and Bolton 2013 at 187-88. 
14  Penfold and Reyburn 2013; and Bolton The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) at 
42-43 (hereafter, Bolton 2007). 
15  In the recent case of KOPM Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Premier, Gauteng Province and Others 2013 (3) SA 240 
(ECP), the court held that the requirements of procedural fairness apply both during the pre-tender 
award process and in the post-tender process during which the procuring entity and the successful 
tenderer might be engaged in negotiations towards reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. 
According to the court, openness, transparency and bona fide negotiations are among the applicable 
requisites flowing from the procedural fairness criterion. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Bolton The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 40 (hereafter, Bolton 2007). 
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Perhaps the most remarkable difference between public procurement regulation in South 
Africa and much of the continent is the constitutionalisation of key elements of that 
framework.18 The fundamental rights of potential bidders/suppliers to access information 
and administrative justice are contained in sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution 
respectively. As explicitly required by the Constitution, Parliament has enacted specific 
legislation designed to provide fuller expression to the said rights.19 Section 32 provides 
everyone with the right of access, firstly, to any information that is held by the state and, 
secondly, to any information that is in the possession of another person required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights. This provision directly reinforces the s 217 constitutional 
commandment that public procurement must be undertaken in accordance with a system 
that is, inter alia, transparent.20 From the private parties’ perspective, the s 32 and PAIA-
related rights are most valuable in assuring them that whenever they seek to challenge a 
public procurement decision via judicial review, the legal framework will secure for them 
the necessary non-public information in the possession of both the procuring and private 
entities involved.21  
 
Regarding administrative justice, while the first sub-section of s 33 of the constitution 
confers every South African resident with the right to administrative action22 that is lawful, 
                                                          
18 The other countries where the Constitution is an important part of the public procurement system 
are Kenya and Namibia. The new Constitution of Kenya has largely constitutionalised public 
procurement along South African lines. In fact, its s 227 (entitled “Procurement of public goods and 
services”) is largely a replica of the procurement clause (s 217) in South Africa’s Constitution. It 
clearly provides for the right of access to information (s 35); and the right to fair administrative action 
(s 47); and lays the foundation of an ‘a transparent and accountable’ public administration in s 129 
(Principles of executive authority), s 201 (Principles of public finance), and s 232 (Values and 
principles of public service). See Constitution of Kenya, 2010 available at: www.kenyalaw.org. See 
also Article 18 of the Constitution of Namibia 1990; and Amoo and Dicken “The regulatory 
framework for public procurement in Namibia” in Quinot and Arrowsmith 2013 123 at 128. 
19 These are: the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (hereafter, PAIA) and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter, PAJA). 
20  Bolton 2007 at 54. 
21  Ibid. The scope or extent of prospective bidders’ right to a process that is transparent has been 
recently clarified by the judgement of the SCA in South African National Roads Agency Ltd v Toll Collect 
Consortium 2013 (6) SA 356. According to the court, the criterion of transparency only requires the 
procuring entity to disclose the basic criteria upon which tenders will be evaluated. Where a refined 
process of scoring is adopted at the point of evaluating tenders, transparency does not require 
disclosure of  such a process unless non-disclosure would mislead tenderers or leave them in the dark 
as to the information required of them in order to satisfy the tender’s requirements. See para 22. 
22  According to Burns 2012 at 151-152, the South African courts have found ‘administrative action’ to 
include actions taken by a public authority or functionary in the course of a tender process. See also 
Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province and Others 
2008 (2) SA 481, para 4; KOPM Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Premier, Gauteng Province and Others 2013 (3) SA 240 
(ECP); and Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA). 
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reasonable and procedurally fair, the second sub-section provides that everyone whose 
rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons. In the context of public procurement,23 the cumulative effect of sections 32 and 33 is 
to require the procuring entities to provide potential contractors with adequate access to the 
procurement process and ensure that they are all provided with ample time to participate in 
the process.24 According to Bolton, “the procedurally fair treatment of contractors also gives 
effect to the principle of competitiveness and, in turn, cost-effectiveness because competition 
would be sufficiently wide”.25 
 
Part of the constitutional setting of public procurement in South Africa is, first, the culture of 
accountability that the constitution seeks to entrench,26 and, second, the robust and 
uncompromising manner in which the courts (especially the appellate courts) have nurtured 
the development of that culture. There is now academic and judicial consensus that South 
Africa’s post-apartheid constitutions succeeded in transforming the state from one that was 
based on authority (pre-1993) to one that “is now based on a legal culture of state 
accountability and transparency in which democratic values and principles must be 
respected and upheld by the public administration”.27 The accountability-related duties of 
the post-apartheid government in South Africa are entrenched in clear and elaborate 
language found in different parts of the constitution.28 For example, s 1(d) declares that 
“accountability, responsiveness and openness form part of the founding provisions of a 
system of democratic government”.29 Also instructive in this regard is s 41(c) of the 
                                                          
23  Post-1994, South African courts have been consistent in holding that the various steps involved in 
the process by which state entities procure goods or services constitute administrative action and are 
accordingly subject to compliance with the provisions of both s 33 of the Constitution and the PAJA. 
Ibid. See also, the very recent decision of the Constitutional Court in AllPay Consolidated Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others 
[2013] ZACC 42 (delivered on 29 November 2013). 
24  Bolton 2007 at 48. 
25  Ibid. 
26  See Steenkamp No v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); 2007 (3) BCLR 300 
(CC) para 33. 
27  Burns 2012 103. According to Professors Iain Currie and Johan de Waal, “accountability includes 
the idea of justification but requires even more. It requires a willingness to make amends for any fault 
or error and the taking of steps to prevent their recurrence in future”. See Currie and de Waal The 
New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2001) vol 1 at 90. 
28 Okpaluba “Delictual liability of public authorities: Pitching the constitutional norm of 
accountability against the ‘floodgates’ argument” (2006) 2 Speculum Juris 248, 252; Beukes “Review as 
a tool for the development of a culture of accountability in the public administration” (2002) 17 SA 
Public Law 244; Burns “A rights-based philosophy of administrative law and a culture of justification” 
(2002) 17 SA Public Law 279; and Burns (2012) 102-103. 
29  Ibid. 
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constitution which, in entrenching the principle of co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations requires all three spheres of government to provide effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the collective good of the entire 
nation.30 It is most significant that this constitutional norm of accountability has been critical 
to the ability of South African courts to carve out a remedy of compensatory damages in 
respect of pure economic loss resulting from maladministration.31 
 
As a general proposition, therefore, the grounds for judicial review and the available 
remedies logically flow out of the above-mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions. 
Accordingly, tender awards can be judicially reviewed on the grounds of: 
 Legality (or lawfulness); 
 Procedural fairness; and 
 Reasonableness.32 
As will appear from some of the case law discussed below, South African courts have shown 
a tendency to locate the bases of their decisions in a combination of the provisions of the 
Constitution, the PAJA, the PPPFA, the PFMA and related statutory/policy instruments 
(such as the Treasury Regulations and Preferential Procurement Regulations).33 Indeed, one 
of the principles that originates from the judicial pronouncements is that a violation of either 
one of the applicable statutory provisions is treated, almost automatically, as constituting an 
affront on the underlying s 217 constitutional values.34  
 
5 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TENDER AWARDS AND EMERGING PRINCIPLES 
Out of every tender process emerges one or more disappointed/losing suppliers and, of 
course, a successful tenderer. While the latter would eagerly desire that the contract and 
performance envisioned by the tender become reality without any delay, the former would, 
on the basis of any apparent impropriety want to launch a challenge seeking either to have 
the tender awarded to it or to receive the anticipated/lost profits or, at the least, to have the 
award of the tender invalidated in order to create a second chance to compete for it.35 In 
                                                          
30 See also s 195(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
31 Okpaluba 2006 at 252. 
32  Bolton 2013 at 184. 
33  South African National Roads Agency Ltd v Toll Collect Consortium 2013 (6) SA 356 (SCA), para 27. 
34  AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v The Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency and Others 2013 ZACC 42  paras 24-27. 
35 Gordon 2006 at 444. Based on their review jurisdiction, South African courts have a fairly wide 
range of remedies available to them including invalidation/setting aside, mandatory or prohibitory 
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deciding whether to intervene at all and what relief is most appropriate in any tender-
related dispute, a court must consider a number of potentially conflicting factors and make 
certain trade-offs.36 Some of those factors are: 
 Ensuring compliance with the standard of legality (and thereby insist on government 
by the rule of law); 
 Ensuring integrity in public procurement (and thereby enhance citizens’ trust and 
confidence in government); 
 Avoiding wasteful expenditure (and thereby help conserve limited and desperately 
needed public funds); 
 Avoiding/reducing delays in the performance of public contracts and related service 
delivery (and thereby ensure effective government); and 
 Dispensing justice to the private parties and their interests (and thereby vindicate 
their constitutional and other pertinent legal rights).37 
The tension or conflict between the above considerations and the manner in which the 
courts will resolve it will naturally depend on the circumstances of each case. Part of the 
objective of this paper is to explore how the courts are negotiating that tension/conflict. 
 
5 1 General rule in respect of appropriate judicial response to ‘irregular’ tender award: 
Invalidation 
 
The settled position under South African law is that where it has been found that a tender 
award is tainted by a material/significant irregularity, both the process followed and the 
resulting award could be properly treated as constituting a violation of the applicable 
statutory provisions38 as well as an affront on the principles and values encapsulated in s 
217(1) of the Constitution. It is therefore not surprising that the preferred judicial response to 
such an award is an order of invalidation setting the award aside.39 That response is 
obviously the most consistent with the principle of legality (and the public interest in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interdicts, and compensation. See Bolton 2007 309-42; and Quinot “Enforcement of procurement law 
from a South African perspective” (2011) 20 Public Procurement Law Review 193.  
36  Quinot, supplier remedies, 333. 
37  Ibid. See also, Bolton 2013 179. 
38  PAJA, PPPFA, PFMA, MFMA, etc. 
39  In so doing, the court effectively protects and enforces the Constitution. See Okpaluba and Osode 
Government Liability – South Africa and the Commonwealth (2010) at 157 (hereafter, Okpaluba and 
Osode). 
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government that is subject to the rule of law).40 For that purpose, it is exceedingly valuable 
that public entities, their functionaries and their legal advisers be in no doubt as to the fate 
certain to befall any tender award tainted by one or more irregularities. 
 
Accordingly, where practical considerations (including potential financial impact on the 
public purse) permit, such a tender award and the resulting contract should not be allowed 
to stand even where performance of that contract has almost run its course. That is the 
principle flowing out of the decision in Eskom Holdings Ltd and Another v New Reclamation 
Group (Pty) Ltd.41 It follows that under South African public procurement law, unless there 
are compelling reasons (including practical considerations), an irregular tender award 
should be invalidated.  
 
Whether such reasons/considerations existed was part of what the SCA had to determine in 
the Eskom Holdings42 case. The tender here was for the collection and disposal of non-ferrous 
scrap metals. The request for quotation (RFQ) specifically required, inter alia, the submission 
of a signed ‘Financial Evaluation Form’ to enable the procuring entity (Eskom) to determine 
that it is placing business with viable companies. The successful tenderer (KW) was one of 
five subsidiaries belonging to a group of companies (RH). In support of its tender 
submission, KW provided the balance sheet of RH. While there was no evidence that RH 
was obliged to provide KW with funding to perform its contractual obligations, there was in 
fact evidence that KW was not financially sound. In awarding the tender to KW, Eskom 
chose to rely on the financial information of RH. The contract flowing from the tender was 
intended to be ad hoc in nature in that each instruction given by Eskom to the contractor to 
collect the material would constitute a separate independent disposal agreement 
incorporating the terms of the tender award. The SCA held that the award to KW was fatally 
flawed in that Eskom took irrelevant considerations into account and failed to consider 
relevant considerations resulting in an illegal decision pursuant to the pertinent provisions 
of the PAJA.43 Given the ad hoc nature of the contract involved in this case, there were, 
                                                          
40  In the very recent case of South African National Roads Agency Ltd v Toll Collect Consortium 2013 (6) 
SA 356, para 27, the SCA, per Wallis JA, held that the courts could only properly interfere with tender 
awards “if the process were infected with illegality” and that there should be no judicial hesitation to 
interfere with such awards where there is impropriety or corruption.  
41  2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA). 
42  Ibid. 
43  In terms of the provisions of s 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA, such a decision is illegal. 
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according to the SCA, no public policy considerations which militated against setting aside 
the tender award.  
 
In its most recent decision in the case of AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings & Others v 
The Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency & Others,44 the SCA held 
that a tender award is not to be tampered with unless the irregularities alleged and proven 
had a clear and significant effect in causing the aggrieved tenderer’s loss in the competition 
for the tender. In other words, the mere presence of process irregularities and unfairness is 
not a sufficient basis for setting aside a tender award. According to the SCA, “it would be 
gravely prejudicial to the public interest if the law was to invalidate public contracts for 
inconsequential irregularities.”45 The principles that therefore emerge out of the SCA 
decision in the AllPay Consolidated case are two-fold. First, the presence of one or more 
irregularities will not in every circumstance justify judicial intervention by way of an order 
invalidating the impugned tender. In particular, the alleged irregularities must have 
significantly undermined the competitive position of the disappointed tenderer in the 
procurement process. And second, the likelihood of serious prejudice to the public interest 
resulting from invalidation must be treated as a significant factor militating against a finding 
that such an order is appropriate in the particular circumstances. 
 
In the AllPay Consolidated case, the losing tenderer raised a number of process-related 
complaints, including: 
 That the evaluation criteria and several details contained in the RFP differed 
significantly from those set out in the RFP amendment document; and 
 That while the tender evaluation committee consisted of all its five members when it 
did the evaluation of the bids, one of its members was absent when it met to 
adjudicate on the bids. 
However, the evidence was clear on the fact that while the losing tenderer and the successful 
one were the only two tenderers shortlisted by the evaluation committee, the product that 
was being offered by the losing tenderer did not in fact meet all the technical requirements 
specified in the RFP and, therefore, there was absolutely no prospect of its bid being 
                                                          
44 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA). This case involved a massive five-year multi-billion rand tender for the 
provision of a secure social grants payment solution on behalf of the national body (South African 
Social Security Agency) responsible for the administration of the grants.  
45 At para 21. 
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successful.46 Furthermore, all the irregularities it complained about only involved some 
violation of provisions of applicable Treasury guidelines/circulars rather than statutory 
provisions. In the circumstances, the SCA came to the conclusion that the process 
irregularities were in the circumstances neither decisive of the outcome nor serious enough 
to damage the legal quality of the entire process.   
 
5 2 Judicial approach where the contract based on an irregular tender award cannot be 
easily terminated 
 
South African appellate judges have been much more cautious in deciding what is the 
‘appropriate relief’ to grant or the ‘just and equitable order’ to make in those cases where the 
impugned tender award has become a state contract in respect of which performance has 
commenced. Their lordships have been unequivocal in pointing out that an order to set 
aside such a tender award presents potentially catastrophic consequences for both the public 
interest/society (represented by the procuring entity) and the successful tenderer.47 From 
the public interest perspective, the implications/consequences that must be carefully 
weighed up when adjudicating tender awards allegedly tainted by one or more 
irregularities include: 
 Waist of public money resulting from abortion of the contract’s performance/ 
disruptions coupled with the transaction costs that must be incurred in making a 
fresh tender award and concluding a new contract as well as the potential legal costs 
resulting from litigation by the successful tenderer seeking damages for breach of 
contract by the State; and 
 Potentially lengthy delay in the delivery of the subject matter of the tender with 
concomitant knock-on effects on service delivery and quality of life for the intended 
beneficiaries. 
For the successful contractor who has commenced the work already, there are serious 
financial implications. First, this party faces the loss of a business opportunity that it firmly 
believed it had won and in respect of which it had mobilized and committed financial, 
                                                          
46 It seemed that this point weighed heavily on the court’s mind as it did express the view that 
invalidating the award and remitting the matter back to the tender evaluation committee would be of 
no benefit to the appellant (losing tenderer) seeing that its product simply did not meet the 
requirements of the procuring entity as expressed in the RFP. 
47 See Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) 
SA 481 (SCA); and Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 (4) 
SA 359 (SCA). 
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human and other resources. Second, the contractor faces legal/liability costs likely to flow 
from the sub-contracts which it will be forced to terminate following the invalidation of its 
tender. 
Against the above background, it is both extremely rational and plausible that South Africa’s 
recent appellate jurisprudence reveals a clear reluctance to set aside an irregular tender 
award that has reached the contract performance stage by the time of judicial review. A 
careful reading of that jurisprudence suggests that invalidation should only be considered 
‘appropriate relief’ where the court is satisfied that the order will not impose excessive 
costs/inconvenience on both the public authority and the successful tenderer. Clearly, it is 
plausible that courts should be slow to set aside a tender award in such circumstances 
because it will generally be contrary (and indeed unfair) to the public interest in ensuring 
that ‘public funds‘ are not wasted. It is submitted that this is the principle that emerges out 
of the SCA decision in Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) 
Ltd & Another.48 A careful perusal of the court’s judgment in this case suggests that the 
judicial discretion to grant a ‘just and equitable order’ in response to an illegal/tainted 
tender award can only be properly exercised after a careful consideration of the following 
factors: 
 The degree of the irregularity; 
 The presence or absence of fraud, dishonesty, wrongdoing or some blameworthy 
conduct on the part of the successful tenderer;49 
 The nature of the contract (resulting from the tender award) – whether it is divisible 
or indivisible;50 
 The interests of the two competing tenderers and those of the public/state (including 
the effect of suspension/delay in the performance of the contract on the citizens 
expected to benefit directly or indirectly from the contract’s deliverables as well as 
the impact on the public purse);51 
                                                          
48  2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA). 
49 In Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 
481 (SCA), the irregularity consisted of wrongful disqualification and exclusion of the appellant 
tenderer from the tender evaluation process. The court held, inter alia, that if it had been shown that 
the successful tenderer was in some way complicit in the fate visited upon the appellant, it would 
have been appropriate to set aside the decision to award the tender on that premise alone. See para 
26. 
50 Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another  2007 (4) SA 488 (C); [2007] 1 All SA 
393. 
51 See Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 
481 (SCA), para 29. 
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 The nature of the intervening events that occurred between the  time of the tender 
award and the judicial review; and 
 The practical legal consequences of invalidating the tender award. 
 
Most instructively, the SCA in the Moseme case seemed to be calling for judicial restraint 
when it concluded that “considerations of pragmatism and practicality were relevant”52 in 
the exercise of the underlying judicial discretion and that it is “not every slip in the 
administration of tenders that is necessarily to be visited by judicial sanction”.53 It is 
submitted that the primary rationale for this approach to the adjudication of tender-related 
irregularities lies in the need to protect the public interest(s) which lie at the heart of every 
public procurement decision. In this context, the courts appear to be prioritising the 
objectives of (a) avoiding unnecessary delays to the conclusion and/or performance of 
public contracts resulting from tender awards; and (b) avoiding wasteful expenditures and 
thereby consistently ensure value for money. It is especially striking that both the detail and 
tenor of the SCA decision in the Moseme case suggest judicial inclination to permit an 
irregular (and therefore illegal) tender award to stand where the practical and financial costs 
of invalidating it are substantial. It is submitted that this is one of those extraordinary 
scenarios in which the value of legality/rule of law is seemingly trumped by pragmatism.  
 
5 3 Circumstances when invalidation of a tender award will be appropriate 
Accepting that South Africa’s recent appellate jurisprudence calls for the setting aside of 
irregular tender awards only after the careful consideration and weighing-up of a whole 
range of interests and factors, the critical question then is this: In what circumstances would 
it be just and equitable to grant such an order and precisely how should the terms of such an 
order be configured? The case of Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender 
Board: Limpopo Province and Others54 is the most recent authoritative decision in this regard. It 
involved a five-year tender for the removal, treatment and disposal of healthcare waste 
material from provincial hospitals. The appellant was one of 14 companies that responded to 
the Health and Social Development tender advert. The evaluation process, conducted by a 
departmental tender committee, was divided into two phases, the one focusing on 
administrative compliance and the other on technical compliance. The appellant’s tender 
                                                          
52  At para 15. 
53  At para 21. 
54  2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA). 
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was one of seven that were disqualified in the first phase. Its disqualification was for failure 
to sign a ‘declaration of interest’ form as was required by the tender invitation.55 Of the 
seven remaining tenders, six were disqualified in the second phase for failure to comply 
with technical requirements which left only one tender remaining, that of a consortium 
which was subsequently awarded the tender. While the appellant had tendered to provide 
the service at a cost of R444 244,43 per month, the consortium’s quote was R3 642 257,28 per 
month. Although the appellant did its utmost to seek judicial review with speed, by the time 
the matter came before the SCA, the resulting contract had 29 months to run.  
 
In the review proceedings, the Department and the Tender Board contended that the 
appellant’s tender was properly disqualified because the administrative requirements were 
couched in peremptory language and that non-compliance resulted in the tender not 
constituting an ‘acceptable tender’ under the PPPFA. The SCA held that the Department’s 
tender committee acted unreasonably by choosing to disqualify the appellant’s tender for 
what was an innocent and minor omission. According to the court, conditions such as that 
relied upon by the tender committee should not be mechanically applied without regard to a 
tenderer’s constitutional rights. The decision to disqualify was based on the committee’s 
error in thinking that the omission amounted to a failure to comply with a condition 
envisaged in the PPPFA. Accordingly, that decision was ‘materially influenced by an error 
of law’, one of the review grounds contemplated in s 6(2)(d) of PAJA.56 The tender process 
followed by the Department was therefore inconsistent with PAJA. In particular, the SCA 
held that the tender committee ought to have condoned the appellant’s failure to sign the 
declaration of interest form because such condonation would have served the public interest 
by facilitating competition among the tenderers and thereby promote the values of fairness, 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness listed in s 217 of the Constitution.57 
 
In determining what order would be just and equitable in the circumstances of this case, the 
SCA flagged a number of concerns/factors, namely: 
 The interests of all three sides to the dispute (the appellant/disappointed tenderer, 
the successful tenderer, and the public authority); 
                                                          
55  Para 6. It should be noted that the ‘declaration of interest’ form included in the appellant’s tender 
was properly completed in all respects except for the signature that was inadvertently omitted. 
56  Para 21. 
57  Para 17. 
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 The public’s need and interest in the safe removal and disposal of hospital waste on 
an uninterrupted basis; 
 The absence of state capacity to meet the said need and the uncertainty of the cost of 
interim measures capable of being taken if the contract was terminated;  
 The substantial price differential between the two private parties’ tenders and the 
potential saving for the public purse should the tender be set aside; and 
 The need for avoidance of uncertainty and chaotic disruption if the contract is 
terminated. 
 
In the court’s view, an appropriate order in the circumstances had to maintain a balance 
between the parties’ conflicting interests while taking into account the public interest.58  It 
concluded that an order which (a) required the two private parties’ tenders to be evaluated 
(on a head-to-head basis) and (b) made the setting aside of the impugned tender award 
contingent upon a finding that the appellant’s tender ought to be accepted - would fully 
vindicate the appellant’s rights without causing any significant disruption to the underlying 
service provision or resulting in avoidable financial loss to the public purse.59 
 
It was against the above background that the SCA fashioned an extra-ordinary two-part 
order that was configured such that the implementation of the second part depended on the 
outcome of implementation of the first part.60 In effect, whether the second part would 
become operative at all was contingent upon the outcome of compliance with the first part. 
Essentially, the second part was to be deemed suspended pending conclusion of 
(compliance) action on the first or initial part of the order which consisted of the following: 
 A declaration that the exclusion of the appellant and subsequent decision to award 
the tender to the successful tenderer is invalid; and  
 A directive that the tender board evaluate the tenders submitted by the appellant 
and the consortium relative to one another and to make its decision within two and a 
half months. 
 
According to the SCA’s decision, if the tender board’s re-consideration still results in a 
decision to award the tender to the successful tenderer, then the resulting contract would 
                                                          
58  Para 32. 
59  Ibid. 
60  The order of the SCA is set out at para 35. For a brief scholarly commentary noting and applauding 
the novelty of the order, see Quinot, supplier remedies, 331-32. 
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remain extant (and the consortium would simply continue performance ‘as usual’). 
However, if the tender board’s decision produced a decision to award the tender to the 
appellant, then the second part of the court’s order (which consisted of a number of further 
orders) became operative (on the last day of the month in which the decision is made).61  
 
6 COMPENSATION ON THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR TENDER-
RELATED FRAUD 
 
The question as to whether an unsuccessful tenderer can recover compensatory (delictual) 
damages for pure economic loss resulting from fraudulent conduct by a procuring entity’s 
officials in the course of a tender process came before the South African courts in the case of 
Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO,62 in which the question was answered in the 
affirmative.63 Here, the tender involved was for the procurement of an automated 
fingerprint identification and verification technology for welfare payouts. The technology 
and related services were sought by the state which was at the time desperate to stamp out 
massive fraud in the system of welfare grant registrations and payments. The respondent 
(3D-ID) was one of 13 entities that responded to the state’s call for same. Given its 
experience in working with the government department involved as well as the unique 
technology it had acquired, 3D-ID was fairly confident of its chances. However, the tender 
was awarded to a tenderer (Nisec) which was formed a few days before the tender invitation 
was issued and, therefore, had no prior experience in the information technology sector. 
While 3D-ID cried foul immediately after the tender award to Nisec was announced and 
followed up with judicial review proceedings, it was almost five years later that it acquired 
sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to mount a claim for damages. The pertinent information 
showed that: 
                                                          
61 The details of the second part of the court’s order were as follows: (a) the decision to award the 
tender to the successful tenderer is set aside; (b) the successful tenderer is entitled to all moneys 
properly due to it in terms of the contract as of the last date of the month in which the decision is 
made; and (c) the successful tenderer shall not be prejudiced by the court’s order in respect of any 
claim it might have for any losses it might have suffered in consequence of its tender being accepted 
and subsequently being set aside.  
62  2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA). 
63 The fact that South African courts have answered this question in the affirmative is instructive for 
the rest of the Commonwealth where the courts have generally shown prejudice against the question 
of the practicality (and therefore the appropriateness) of damages as a remedy for victims of fraud in 
the administrative process. See SZFDE v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35 (HCA); 
Okpaluba and Osode at 170; and Quinot, supplier remedies, 328-30. 
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 Two senior employees of the department (Louw and Scholtz) fraudulently conspired 
with two Nisec representatives to secure the award for Nisec; 
 10 days before the closing date, Louw and Scholtz along with the said 
representatives of Nisec prepared Nisec’s tender on the premises of the said 
government department; 
 Louw and Scholtz had corruptly negotiated employment contracts for themselves 
with Nisec in addition to receiving substantial bribes (which Nisec had paid into 
their wives’ accounts); 
 Louw, being the official charged with steering the evaluation committee and drafting 
the submissions to both the provincial executive and the State Tender Board, used 
various lies, concealments and distortions to manipulate the entire process in order 
to secure the award to Nisec. 
 
Horrified at the prospect of being held liable to compensate 3D-ID for the losses it suffered 
as a result of not having received the lucrative five-year tender, the government parties 
(Western Cape Provincial Government) and the national government (responsible for the 
State Tender Board) contended, inter alia, that they were not vicariously liable for the corrupt 
conduct of Louw and Scholtz and that public policy demanded that a public body be 
immunised from liability for the consequences of fraud committed (by its officials/agents) in 
the course of a tender process.64 The High Court held that although under South African law 
of vicarious liability, a deliberately dishonest act committed solely for the employee’s own 
interests and purposes may fall outside the ambit of conduct for which the employer is 
ordinarily liable, liability may nevertheless be imposed where there is a sufficiently close 
link between the self-directed conduct and the employer’s business. It was on this premise 
that the trial court held the state defendants vicariously liable for the losses suffered by 3D-
ID. 
 
On appeal, the SCA held, in agreement with the lower court, that the evidence was 
compelling in showing “how closely the employees’ actions, though fraudulent, resembled 
what they were employed to do”.65 It concluded that the “closeness of purpose, planning 
and effect indicate that all the policy reasons for requiring the employer to bear the burden 
                                                          
64  Para 11. 
65  Para 30. 
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of its employees’ wrongdoing”66 applied in this case. Accordingly, the state defendants 
could not escape vicarious liability. With particular regard to the contention that the state 
parties should be granted immunity from vicarious liability for their employees’ fraudulent 
conduct in tender processes, the SCA held that “the cost to the public of exempting a 
fraudulent perpetrator from liability for fraud would be too high”.67 
 
It is clearly apparent that their lordships carefully weighed up the potential financial costs of 
such a liability rule against the potential risk of widespread tender-related fraud/impunity 
in the absence of such a rule. However, there is no doubt that the rule is prima facie costly, as 
it did in fact turn out in the Gore case.68 To be sure, it effectively requires the procuring entity 
to ‘double-dip’ into the ‘public coffers’ in respect of the same contract. And, in fact, when 
paying out the compensatory damages to the aggrieved losing tenderer, the procuring entity 
will usually have to pay not just the lost profits of that tenderer but the interest that could 
have accrued on those profits as well as the legal costs of the tenderer. However, it is 
submitted that the expectation and hope (which informed the SCA’s decision in Gore) is that 
the rule established in the case should create a significant (negative) incentive for the State as 
an employer to design and implement effective employee-related fraud-prevention 
strategies as part of its procurement system.69 
 
It is especially remarkable that compensatory relief was granted in Gore several years after 
the tainted tender award had been discharged. But clearly, the remedy sought by 3D-ID and 
                                                          
66  Ibid. 
67  Para 88. 
68  The awards to which 3D-ID was entitled was finally determined by the High Court in October 2008 
in Gore NO v Minister of Finance and Others, [2008] ZAGPHC 338, 30 October 2008 available at: 
www.saflii.org. The main issue there revolved around assessment of the profit lost by the company as 
a result of the fraudulent deprivation of the tender award. That issue in turn revolved around two 
factors: (i) the income which would have derived from the tender; and (ii) the costs which the 
company would have incurred in performing its obligations under the resulting contract. 3D-ID had 
claimed that as a consequence of the defendants’ fraud, it suffered damages in the sum of 
R380 275 651, alternatively, R253 550 554. Proceeding on the basis that it would be reasonable to apply 
a 15% reduction for contingencies when assessing the profits which the company would have earned 
during the five-year life-span of the contract, Prinsloo J granted a total award in the sum of 
R215 517 500. 
69 Such a system could include the revision of the employment contracts of senior management 
employees so to include a term entitling the state employer to recover from the employee(s) any 
losses incurred as a result of claims originating from tenders tainted by fraud/bad faith/malfeasance 
successfully pursued against the employer by aggrieved tenderers. The legality of such an 
employment contract term under South African law has been recently confirmed by a leading expert 
on South African labour law. See Landman “The implications of an employer claiming for losses from 
an employee” (2011) 20(6) Contemporary Labour Law. 
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granted by the courts in that case “was the only relief that could retrospectively strike at the 
breach of the plaintiff’s right to have been awarded the tender in the first instance”.70 Given 
that the judicial review stage was long past, “no remedy, other than damages, could have 
been suitable in those circumstances”.71 
 
7 NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATION FOR PURE ECONOMIC 
LOSS RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT BUNGLING 
 
On at least three occasions,72 the appellate courts in South Africa have been invited to 
address the question whether an innocent tenderer who has sustained pure economic loss 
due to maladministration, consisting of negligence, in the public procurement process ought 
to be compensated for that loss by an award of damages. On each of the three occasions, the 
apex courts have answered the said question in the negative pronouncing clearly that 
compensatory damages cannot be ‘appropriate relief’ in such cases. Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape73 is the third of that trilogy of cases. Here, the 
administrative failure consisted of the Board’s decision to award the tender to an entity 
which was an unincorporated (and therefore legally non-existent) company at the time of 
the submission, evaluation and adjudication of the tenders. The Board apparently 
misapprehended the technical legal point that a non-existent company could simply not be a 
legally competent recipient of a tender.74 The plaintiff initially won the tender which was 
subsequently declared a nullity on judicial review, the courts finding that there was in law 
no legal entity upon which the rights and obligations accruing from the tender could have 
vested.75 The central question in this action was whether that plaintiff was entitled to recover 
the out-of-pocket expenses it incurred during the tender process from the Board. In other 
words, having had the tender award nullified on grounds of administrative irregularity, 
should the plaintiff be entitled to recover damages for the Tender Board’s negligence?76 
 
                                                          
70  Okpaluba and Osode at 170. 
71 Ibid. Although the facts are different in certain material respects, the losing tenderer was also 
awarded compensatory damages in the case of Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 (1) SA 
299 (SCA). 
72 Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA);Trustees, Two Oceans Acquarium 
Trust v Kantey and Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA); Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape (2007) (3) SA 121 (CC). 
73  2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). 
74  The Board was acting based on powers conferred upon it by statute, namely, the Provincial Tender 
Board Act 2 of 1994. 
75  See Okpaluba and Osode at 136. 
76  Ibid. 
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In the said trilogy of cases, South Africa’s apex courts weighed up a number of policy 
considerations in arriving at their conclusion that damages for pure economic loss ought not 
to be available to the innocent tenderer in the Steenkamp-type scenarios. For the claim to 
succeed, the plaintiff had to prove the three elements of delictual liability under South 
African law, namely, wrongfulness, negligence and causation. And it was on the first 
element that the claims in the said trilogy of cases failed. In order for wrongfulness to be 
established in such scenarios, the plaintiff had to prove either that public policy is in favour 
or that it is within the legal convictions of the community to impose liability against the 
public authority in such a case.77 The policy considerations which the appellate courts 
viewed as militating against the imposition of state liability in such scenarios are: 
 Whether the operative statute anticipates compensation of damages for the 
aggrieved party directly or by inference; 
 Whether there are alternative remedies such as an interdict, review or appeal;  
 Whether the object of the statutory scheme is mainly to protect individuals or 
advance the public good; 
 Whether the statutory power conferred grants the public functionary a discretion in 
decision-making; 
 Whether an imposition of liability is likely to have a ‘chilling effect’ on the 
performance of an administrative or statutory function;  
 Whether the party bearing the loss is the author of its misfortune; and 
 Whether the harm that ensued was foreseeable.78 
 
On the authority of the said trilogy of cases, the current position under South African law is 
that a negligent but bona fide failure to comply with the requirements of administrative 
justice in the course of a public procurement process will not avail a delictual cause of action 
for damages in respect of pure economic loss to tenderers, successful or unsuccessful.79 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid. 
79  See Okpaluba and Osode 2010 at 153-160. 
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8 DUTY OF ORGANS OF STATE TO ACT AGAINST TENDER-RELATED 
WRONGDOING 
 
The case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 
and Another80 is probably the very first case involving the vexing subject of ‘fronting’81 to 
reach the Constitutional Court after commencing its journey from the Western Cape High 
Court and making a ‘pit stop’ at the SCA. The facts of the case were fairly straightforward. 
The respondent (Hidrotech) and the appellant (Viking) were competitors in the supply and 
installation of mechanical and electrical equipment for water and sewerage treatment works 
to a number of municipalities including the City of Cape Town (the City). Upon discovering 
that it was losing multiple tenders advertised by the City to Viking, Hidrotech undertook an 
investigation which led to its finding that the reason behind Viking’s continuing competitive 
edge over it was its higher historically disadvantaged individual (HDI) profile. That profile 
consisted in the fact that while 70% of Viking’s shares were held by HDIs, the converse 
obtained in Hidrotech. This resulted in Viking consistently receiving higher preference 
points which in turn led to the success of its tenders/bids. As part of its investigation, 
Hidrotech came into possession of information which showed that the two HDIs who each 
held 35% of Viking’s shares neither received remuneration nor exercised management 
control over the company commensurate with the extent of their shareholding. This 
information was promptly provided to the City by way of two affidavits sworn by one of the 
said HDIs and a former director of Viking as well as through written communications 
addressed to the City by Hidrotech’s attorneys. The City’s three-stage response was as 
follows:  
 It commissioned a private database management company to verify Viking’s 
shareholding and confirm that the shareholding was as reflected in its tender 
documents. 
 It handed the matter over to its in-house legal advisers. 
 It advised Hidrotech to refer its complaint to the Department of Trade and Industry. 
                                                          
80  2011 (1) SA 327 (CC). 
81  ‘Fronting’ is a practice which is also sometimes referred to as ‘window dressing’ or ‘tokenism’. It 
essentially involves the procurement and registration of fictitious black shareholders by white-
controlled companies in order to obtain preference points which are now virtually indispensable to 
securing tenders in public and quasi-public entities. See Bolton 2007 at 293-94. 
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When the City declined Hidrotech’s demands that it conduct a proper investigation into the 
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations against Viking and that the award of any 
further tenders to Viking be halted, Hidrotech launched this litigation which wound its way 
to the CC. Both the High Court82 and the SCA83 found in favour of Hidrotech. The main 
issue before the CC was whether the City had discharged its obligation to properly 
investigate the Hidrotech complaint as required by the applicable legislative prescripts. This 
in turn required the court to determine the meanings of ‘detect’ and ‘act against’ as used in 
regulation 15(1) of the Preferential Procurement Regulations 200184 which provides: 
“An organ of State must, upon detecting that a preference in terms of the Act and 
these regulations has been obtained on a fraudulent basis, or any specified goals are 
not attained in the performance of the contract, act against the person awarded the 
contract”. 
Essentially, the CC had to determine, first, whether under the circumstances, the City could 
be properly said to have ‘detected’ the obtaining of preference (by Viking) on a fraudulent 
basis and, second, whether the conduct of the City was, under the circumstances, sufficient 
in complying with its obligations in terms of the said regulation. 
The CC agreed with the SCA that regulation 15(1) “ensures that no organ of state will 
remain passive in the face of evidence of fraudulent preferment, but is obliged to take 
appropriate steps to correct the situation”.85 Mogoeng CJ emphasised the need to determine 
the meaning of the said words within the context of the Procurement Act and the 
Regulations noting that they constitute a “mechanism through which the constitutional 
imperative of empowering the historically disadvantaged individuals is sought to be 
realised”.86 In his view, the attainment of that social transformative goal could only “be done 
by rooting out any fraudulent scheme designed to divert the economic benefits primarily 
                                                          
82  Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2010 (1) SA 483 (C). 
83 Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa and Another v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2010 
(3) SA 365 (SCA). 
84  Government Gazette 22549 of 2001 (hereafter, PPR 2001). 
85  Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa and Another v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2010 
(3) SA 365 (SCA), para 32. 
86 2011 (1) SA, para 28. See also, AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief 
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others [2013] ZACC 42, para 47 (where 
Froneman J stated that: “Economic redress for previously disadvantaged people also lies at the heart 
of our constitutional and legislative procurement framework”. 
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reserved for historically disadvantaged individuals, to historically empowered 
individuals”.87 
Regarding the meaning of the word ‘detect’, the CC held that it meant no more than 
discovering, getting to know, coming to the realisation, being informed, having reason to 
believe, or entertaining a reasonable suspicion that allegations of fraud by the successful 
tenderer are plausible.88 The apex court preferred a broad meaning of the word and ruled 
that responsive action was required of an organ of state once it came into possession of 
information which could, on verification, expose a fraudulent scheme. It followed that the 
regulation 15(1) obligation did not require the existence of conclusive evidence of a 
fraudulent misrepresentation in order to be triggered. On the court’s view of the facts of this 
case, the City’s possession of information sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that 
preference points might have been fraudulently obtained by Viking amounted to a 
detection.89 
According to the CC, what would constitute appropriate action in terms of the regulation 
15(1) obligation to ‘act against’ the (allegedly fraudulent) successful tenderer should depend 
on what the court described as the degree or level of detection which in turn depends on the 
quality of information in the possession of the organ of State.90 In this regard, the court 
pointed to three possibilities namely: 
(a) Conducting a proper/in-depth/effective investigation (either using own resources or 
by referral to a competent person or institution) – where, for example, the 
information received is scanty; 
(b) Engaging in a process to determine culpability – where the information received is 
largely conclusive; and/or 
(c) Engaging in a process to determine the appropriate penalty91 (to be imposed on the 
offending party) – where sufficient information has been received and culpability 
established. 
                                                          
87  Ibid. 
88  2011 (1) SA, para 31 
89  2011 (1) SA, para 32. 
90  Ibid. 
91  This is in accordance with Regulation 14 of the PPR 2001. 
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On the question whether the steps taken by the City were adequate, the CC noted that 
verification of the correct shareholding in Viking through the company’s register was 
irrelevant to the complaint of fronting levelled against it. Accordingly, the court held that 
the steps taken by the City to investigate the matter amounted to a failure to perform its 
duty to ‘act against’ Viking by properly investigating Hidrotech’s allegations. Such an 
investigation could, according to the court, have been conducted by the City itself or by a 
referral of the matter to either the Commercial Crimes Unit of the South African Police 
Service, the Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation, the National Prosecuting 
Authority or a firm of forensic accountants.  
There are a number of pertinent points of principle which derive from the above CC 
decision. First, there is a compelling public interest in the proper implementation of the 
preferential procurement policy which requires zero tolerance of fraudulent manipulation of 
any preferential points scheme implemented in terms of that policy.92 Obviously, if 
sufficiently widespread, such manipulation will significantly undermine the intended 
transformative impact of the policy. Second, notwithstanding the costs and inconvenience 
that might be involved, procuring entities must take prompt and effective 
remedial/punitive action under the PPR upon receipt of credible allegations of fraud in 
securing the award of preference points contrary to regulation 15(1) of the PPR. Third, the 
nature and extent of the action required of procuring entities faced with a possible violation 
of regulation 15(1) will depend on the circumstances of each case and especially upon the 
quality and quantum of the information in its possession. Fourth, where the information 
suggesting the likelihood of a regulation 15(1) violation is scanty or inconclusive, the course 
of action required of the procuring entity by the regulation is (a) to conduct a thorough and 
effective investigation; (b) depending on the outcome, determine the alleged offender’s 
culpability; and (c) determine the appropriate penalty. 
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The quality of governance in public procurement is especially important for the purposes of 
increasing the pace of socio-economic development and strengthening trust in the ability 
and willingness of the State to ensure the exclusive utilisation of public funds for public 
                                                          
92 It is now generally accepted that it is both appropriate and legitimate for governments to use public 
procurement as an instrument of social policy. See Quinot, “Promotion of social policy through public 
procurement in Africa” in Quinot and Arrowsmith 2013 370; Arrowsmith 1998 at 7-10; and 
McCrudden “Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: A Legal Overview” in Arrowsmith and 
Davies 1998 at 221-223.   
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good. This is the background/context against which the role and importance of judicial 
interventions in public procurement processes must be understood. A reflective engagement 
with the tender-related appellate jurisprudence discussed in this lecture suggests that the 
courts will, as a general rule, adopt a robust, no-nonsense, zero-tolerance approach towards 
tender-related irregularities. This in turn points to judicial inclination to accord primacy to 
the values/objectives of entrenching legality/rule of law, integrity and good governance as 
well as fairness to the private parties whose interests are engaged in each tender-related 
dispute. However, the same appellate jurisprudence also appears to suggest judicial 
inclination to condone some irregularities/non-compliance where a disappointed tenderer’s 
protest presents a risk of adverse repercussions for the more practical/economic objectives 
of public procurement regulation – such as avoidance of wasteful expenditure by 
consistently ensuring value for money and avoiding or limiting disruptions to contractual 
performance and service delivery thereby ensuring effective government. Where these latter 
goals/objectives are implicated, it appears certain that the orders resulting from the courts’ 
remedial interventions will be carefully configured to ensure that the said 
practical/economic objectives are not undermined by the pursuit of some rigid/absolute 
notion of legality, rule of law, and integrity in public procurement. Clearly, narrow 
conceptions of legality which extol the importance of compliance with legal rules and policy 
prescripts without special regard for their financial and operational implications appear not 
to have found favour with the appellate courts. 
10 FUTURE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SCHOLARSHIP 
For the few South Africa-based scholars who are pursuing research on public procurement, 
future work is likely to have a dual focus. The first should consist of tracking new 
developments in South Africa with a view to assessing their rationality or appropriateness in 
advancing the objectives and values implicated in public procurement processes. The second 
focal point should consist of comparative work on public procurement systems in Africa – 
assessing progress/impact and benchmarking against international standards and 
developments.93 Nigeria will remain a subject of special interest partly because of the great 
strides that it has made since the enactment of its Public Procurement Act 2007 as well as the 
challenges that it is now facing on the implementation front. 
                                                          
93 Some of this work is already being done by the African Public Procurement Regulation Research 
Unit of the Law Faculty at the University of Stellenbosch. See http://blogs.sun.ac.za/apprru.  
